Post-Soviet Russian Armed Forces
The history of the Russian Armed Forces can be traced back all the way to the times of Peter the Great. Even though the Russian Empire was dissolved after the Bolsheviks took power, much of the new armed forces was created upon the old one (or what was left after the devastating World War and Civil War). The Red Army, which is now synonymous with the Soviet and, sometimes, the Russian Armed Forces, became one of the most powerful and best-equipped in the world by the end of World War 2. Unlike the US Military, it only openly participated in a few international conflicts during the length of the Cold War, most famously in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought a major problem to the politicians of the former state: the massive armed forces of the Soviet Union was spread throughout the many newly independent nations, and they need to be reorganized to reflect the new political reality. Some units joined the newly-formed states' national armies, inheriting their legacy Soviet equipment, but others went back to Russia. In Russia itself, initially the status of the armed forces was ambiguous, as there was not much effort into (re)creating the Russian military. While an idea surfaced to keep the Soviet Military under a new organization of the Commonwealth of Independent States, this idea was never considered seriously. Russia was left alone to create their military.
This problem was compounded by the fact that the new Russian state was desperately low on money. Many late-Soviet arms project was cancelled, much of the Soviet-era equipment fell into disuse out of neglect and units had to cut back on their training. While they outwardly looked as powerful as old Soviet Armed Forces, the new Russian Military of early 1990s was actually nowhere near as capable.
The last fact was proven to be painfully true in the First Chechen War. Chechnya is a region in the Southern part of Russia, near Georgia and Turkey. Since the time of the Tsars, many wars have been fought there as Chechen separatists tried to gain their independence from Russia (probably nothing reflect this struggle better than the many works of Romantic Russian literature in the 19th Century). In 1994, then-president Boris Yeltsin ordered troops to be sent into Chechnya to quell a rebellion by Dzhokar Dudayev, the president of the Republic of Chechnya who declared independence in 1991. From the beginning, many in the Armed Forces as well as the political sphere publicly opposed the war, as they do not wish to send the military against what is legally their own people. Yeltsin nonetheless insisted and the war quickly turned into a quagmire. The problems described previously began to manifest in the operational capabilities of the Russian forces. The soldiers sent were barely trained and had poor morale. The Chechens, even though at severe technological disadvantage, managed to inflict heavy casualties and humiliate Russia. The two-year war became a stalemate and Chechen political victory. It was not until the Second Chechen War (1999-2000) that Chechnya would be brought back to the Russian Federation.
The Russian military has been dependent on the economy of the Russian state. The 1998 financial crisis was probably the lowest point of military spending, and subsequently under the economic boom in Vladimir Putin's era in early 2000s, the Armed Forces was re-equipped and reformed along Western lines, as had happened under Peter the Great hundreds of years before. Nonetheless, there were some Soviet-era legacies that were hard to eradicate. Systematic bullying of new conscripts were common, only the officer corps are professional (NCOs - Sergeants and Corporals - were generally senior conscripts) and equipment upgrades were still slow. The demographic crisis of Russia (falling birthrates and emigration) was also problematic for the Armed Forces as they struggle to keep the numbers above the minimum. Another wake-up call happened in the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. Although far from a disaster like Chechnya, the War revealed serious problems with the Russian military. Another major reform was enacted after the war, which slims down the Russian military while increasing its professional core. This reform is currently still on-going.
Today's Russian Military:
As mentioned earlier, the Russian military is generally organized closer to the Western model than the Soviet Armed Forces they were based on. Although officially they have not fought a war since Georgia, the takeover of Crimea was an example on how they operate: they sought to create as much confusion as they can until it was too late for the opponent to respond militarily (refer to my 1st blog post). Russian natural resource exports fuel the tremendous growth of the military in recent years, as they sought to close the gap and reestablish the parity they had with the US military in the 1960s and 70s. Behind this new Russian military is also the growth of EU and NATO, which Russia still perceive as a threat to their sovereignty.
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought a major problem to the politicians of the former state: the massive armed forces of the Soviet Union was spread throughout the many newly independent nations, and they need to be reorganized to reflect the new political reality. Some units joined the newly-formed states' national armies, inheriting their legacy Soviet equipment, but others went back to Russia. In Russia itself, initially the status of the armed forces was ambiguous, as there was not much effort into (re)creating the Russian military. While an idea surfaced to keep the Soviet Military under a new organization of the Commonwealth of Independent States, this idea was never considered seriously. Russia was left alone to create their military.
This problem was compounded by the fact that the new Russian state was desperately low on money. Many late-Soviet arms project was cancelled, much of the Soviet-era equipment fell into disuse out of neglect and units had to cut back on their training. While they outwardly looked as powerful as old Soviet Armed Forces, the new Russian Military of early 1990s was actually nowhere near as capable.
The last fact was proven to be painfully true in the First Chechen War. Chechnya is a region in the Southern part of Russia, near Georgia and Turkey. Since the time of the Tsars, many wars have been fought there as Chechen separatists tried to gain their independence from Russia (probably nothing reflect this struggle better than the many works of Romantic Russian literature in the 19th Century). In 1994, then-president Boris Yeltsin ordered troops to be sent into Chechnya to quell a rebellion by Dzhokar Dudayev, the president of the Republic of Chechnya who declared independence in 1991. From the beginning, many in the Armed Forces as well as the political sphere publicly opposed the war, as they do not wish to send the military against what is legally their own people. Yeltsin nonetheless insisted and the war quickly turned into a quagmire. The problems described previously began to manifest in the operational capabilities of the Russian forces. The soldiers sent were barely trained and had poor morale. The Chechens, even though at severe technological disadvantage, managed to inflict heavy casualties and humiliate Russia. The two-year war became a stalemate and Chechen political victory. It was not until the Second Chechen War (1999-2000) that Chechnya would be brought back to the Russian Federation.
The Russian military has been dependent on the economy of the Russian state. The 1998 financial crisis was probably the lowest point of military spending, and subsequently under the economic boom in Vladimir Putin's era in early 2000s, the Armed Forces was re-equipped and reformed along Western lines, as had happened under Peter the Great hundreds of years before. Nonetheless, there were some Soviet-era legacies that were hard to eradicate. Systematic bullying of new conscripts were common, only the officer corps are professional (NCOs - Sergeants and Corporals - were generally senior conscripts) and equipment upgrades were still slow. The demographic crisis of Russia (falling birthrates and emigration) was also problematic for the Armed Forces as they struggle to keep the numbers above the minimum. Another wake-up call happened in the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. Although far from a disaster like Chechnya, the War revealed serious problems with the Russian military. Another major reform was enacted after the war, which slims down the Russian military while increasing its professional core. This reform is currently still on-going.
Today's Russian Military:
As mentioned earlier, the Russian military is generally organized closer to the Western model than the Soviet Armed Forces they were based on. Although officially they have not fought a war since Georgia, the takeover of Crimea was an example on how they operate: they sought to create as much confusion as they can until it was too late for the opponent to respond militarily (refer to my 1st blog post). Russian natural resource exports fuel the tremendous growth of the military in recent years, as they sought to close the gap and reestablish the parity they had with the US military in the 1960s and 70s. Behind this new Russian military is also the growth of EU and NATO, which Russia still perceive as a threat to their sovereignty.